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The present model is essentially Romer’s (1990) model of endogenous growth with intertemporal 
knowledge externalities, augmented with contemporaneous knowledge externalities to give a richer 
explanation of the growth process. Both types of knowledge spillovers seem essential to capturing the 
features of knowledge in a model of growth. Introducing synchronic complementarities and knowledge 
externalities across inventive firms immediately creates the possibility of multiple equilibria and 
threshold effects in the present model. Another advantage of this theoretical formulation is that it allows 
for an analysis of the effects on steady-state growth of a variety of technology policies relying on 
changing knowledge complementarities parameters. 
 






The present model is essentially Romer’s (1990) model of endogenous growth with 
intertemporal knowledge externalities, augmented with contemporaneous knowledge 
externalities to give a richer explanation of the growth process. Knowledge 
complementarities are very important in this context. They can be diachronic and 
synchronic and they can lead to intertemporal and contemporaneous externalities, 
respectively. Both types of knowledge spillovers seem essential to capturing the 
features of knowledge in a model of growth. Much of the value to society of any given 
innovation or discovery is not, without a doubt, captured by the inventor. This implies 
that any model that missed these spillovers would miss important elements of the 
endogenous nature of technological change and of the growth process.  
Introducing synchronic complementarities and knowledge externalities across inventive 
firms immediately creates the possibility of multiple equilibria and threshold effects in 
the present model. Referring to another standard model of endogenous invention, 
Aghion and Howitt’s (1992) model of growth through creative destruction with 
intertemporal knowledge externalities, Aghion and Howitt (1998) also argue that by 
allowing contemporaneous technology spillovers in research in their basic model, it will 
imply that there can be more than one equilibrium growth rate with positive research.  
Knowledge complementarities are relevant both diachronically and synchronically. 
Firms conducting research can benefit from knowledge externalities stemming from the 
complementarity of innovation activities conducted within the innovation system in the 
past and at each point in time. Hence, knowledge externalities stemming from 
knowledge complementarities do not take place through time across individual 
researchers of different generations alone, but also among contemporaneous inventive 
agents within an innovation system. The contemporaneous technology spillovers in 
  1research are the positive externalities whereby the productivity of any research firm 
depends on the economy-wide level of research. Individuals of the same generation will 
benefit from cross-individual spillovers. And the intertemporal spillovers are the 
positive externalities whereby the knowledge embedded in each innovation can be used 
by future researchers. Researchers can make use of the accumulated knowledge 
embodied in the existing designs. 
Romer’s (1990) specification of the production function of new knowledge does not 
distinguish one type of knowledge spillover from the other, and so does not allow for 
the potential interactive effects between the accumulation of knowledge of an individual 
research unit over time and the contemporaneous spillovers among inventive units, nor 
for an assessment of the relative contributions of these types of spillovers to the 
production of new knowledge for that matter. A key feature of models of the knowledge 
spillover process within a neoclassical theoretical strand, such as Romer (1990) and 
Aghion and Howitt (1992), is that the public-good aspects of knowledge create 
economy-wide increasing returns. The positive externalities considered in Romer 
(1990) are the intertemporal spillovers according to which anyone engaged in research 
has free access to the total stock of knowledge implicit in previous designs. All 
researchers in the economy can benefit from the entire stock of knowledge at the same 
time. As a result, there is a unique stationary equilibrium in the economy. The model 
exhibits the usual single equilibrium outcome, and therefore it is similar to other typical, 
standard models of invention.   
In our paper, however, we let the accumulation of knowledge of an individual inventive 
firm over time to be specified separately in the production process of new designs and 
knowledge from contemporaneous spillovers among inventive firms. The strict 
discrimination between contemporaneous externalities and intertemporal externalities, 
as expressed in our formal model through a multiplicative function of a flow of 
knowledge component and a stock of knowledge component, can naturally lead to a 
multiplicity of steady states, including a no growth steady state. Allowing for both 
knowledge complementarities and their external effects creates the possibility of 
multiple equilibria, with all of the indeterminacies they entail. This multiplicity of 
steady-state paths captures a threshold effect similar to those obtained in other models 
with technological complementarities, in particular Young (1993). 
The intensity of technological spillovers across innovative firms is dependent upon the 
degree of technological and/or regional proximity between firms. From the perspective 
of a firm, the nature of interactions and the efficiency of communication links 
established between the firm and its more distant technological and/or regional context 
become plausibly different from those interactions and communication links established 
within the closer regional or technological proximity of the firm’s local innovation 
system. A local innovation system is characterized by technological knowledge 
localized in tacit learning processes, and transaction costs supported by each research 
firm in communicating and receiving new technology. The nature of a local innovation 
system contrasts with a neoclassical view to technology transfer according to which no 
connection and absorption attritions take place. Analysis of the conditions and context 
for effective technological communication to take place is an important subject matter 
of the innovation system approach (Antonelli, 2001). 
Technological knowledge can be stored although subject to knowledge decay and 
technological obsolescence. The decay or depreciation of the stock of knowledge takes 
place when people forget or let skills deteriorate. The obsolescence of the stock of 
knowledge takes place as old ideas are superseded by new, superior discoveries and 
innovations. Note that these phenomena of knowledge depreciation and technological 
  2obsolescence are distinguished from the obsolescence in value represented by creative 
destruction. Innovations introduce the factor of value obsolescence to the economic 
system: better products and processes render previous ones obsolete. Obsolescence in 
value embodies Schumpeter (1942)’s idea of creative destruction. The payoff from 
innovation in the current period is the prospect of monopoly rents the next period. 
Those rents will last however until the next innovation occurs, at which time the 
knowledge underlying the rents will be rendered obsolete.  
The range of dynamic, general equilibria outcomes derived in our model naturally result 
from adopting a particular production function of new knowledge that has constant 
elasticity of substitution between diachronic complementarities and synchronic 
complementarities, the well-known Cobb-Douglas case. This sort of imperfect 
substitution between synchronic complementarities and diachronic complementarities 
will open the possibility for multiple steady states, including a no growth steady state.  
We could arrive at somewhat different results concerning the number and nature of 
equilibrium outcomes assuming a different pattern of substitutability/complementarity 
in the production function of new knowledge. In fact the picture becomes different in 
the case where the production function approaches a fixed-proportion technology, as 
well as in the case where the production function adopted is linear so that diachronic 
complementarities and synchronic complementarities are perfect substitutes. 
The paper is organized as follows. We describe the structure of the model in Section 2 
and study the microeconomic behavior of research units embedded in a general 
equilibrium setting with technological progress. This section shows how to incorporate 
intertemporal spillovers in research and contemporaneous spillovers in research in the 
basic model of Romer (1990). The existence, the multiplicity, and the stability of 
dynamic general equilibria are analyzed in Section 3. The analysis in this section 
focuses on stationary equilibria with positive growth. The impact of technology policy 
acting through changes in knowledge complementarities parameters is dealt with in 
Section 4. A few concluding remarks are given in Section 5, while some proofs are 
gathered in a separate Appendix. 
 
 
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL 
 
Suppose that there are N distinct research firms operating in the research sector. Only 
the finite number N of existing research firms in the economy can produce inventive 
output. Accordingly, the uninteresting case is one in which no quantity of inventive 
output is produced, either because no potential research unit is attracted into the 
inventive industry or because no firm can remain in business.  
We need to specify the process of accumulation of new designs and knowledge over 
time of each research unit. The production function of every research unit i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N, is 
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where φ , δ, σ, γ and μ are technology parameters, h is firm’s i amount of human capital 
employed in research, and   and   are rates of production of new product 
designs, ideas and knowledge. Last φ is a productivity parameter of the research unit 
such that 0 < φ < 1.  
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  3The model assumes that every research unit i employs the same research technology. 
The crucial feature of the specification used here is that technological 
complementarities in innovation activities enter into the production of new knowledge 
in two distinct ways. The specific formulation used here separates the diachronic 
complementarities within an individual research unit from the synchronic 
complementarities among research units within the innovation system. Hence the 
equation (F) reflects the existence of both intertemporal spillovers and contemporaneous 
spillovers in research activities. 
Each research firm is assumed to be symmetrical with respect to the intertemporal 
externalities in research and the contemporaneous externalities in research. Each type of 
technology spillover effects enters the production function (F) of every research firm in 
the same, yet distinct way. In addition, we also make the simplifying assumption that all 
existing research firms are committed to the same amount h of human capital, because 
we are interested in the scale effect of the spillover process in the economy. According 
to this scale effect, the larger the number N of research firms in the economy, the larger 
the amount of knowledge spillovers and therefore the higher the rate of growth of 
knowledge. By assuming identical research firms in the model, it allows us to determine 
the impact of N active research firms on the rate of growth of new ideas and designs of 
the economy, and so on the dynamic efficiency of the economy.   
The integration of the right-hand side of equation (F) with respect to time yields 
 
() ( )
μ γ σ δ ϕ ∑ = =
N
j j i i t A t A h t A
1 ) ( ) ( ) ( & & ,         ( F )  
 
where  Ai(t) denotes stock of knowledge implicit in previous designs produced by 
research firm i. 
We assume that the growth of knowledge is a function of the stock of knowledge Ai(t) 
of each individual inventive firm, which embodies previous innovations, and also of the 
current flow of innovations of all inventive firms. In the functional form that we use to 
describe the research technology, the flow of knowledge component expresses the 
contribution of synchronic complementarities to the production of new knowledge, 
whereas the stock of knowledge component expresses the contribution of diachronic 
complementarities. Note that  , representing flow concepts, are all measured per 
period of time. On the other hand, A
) (t Aj &
i(t) are stock concepts, and they indicate quantities 
in existence at some specific point of time. 
The common specification of an individual production function of new designs and 
ideas (F) contains two multiplicative components of knowledge, representing diachronic 
technological complementarities and synchronic technological complementarities. Each 
knowledge component of this production function is indispensable given the hypothesis 
of imperfect substitution between knowledge sources assumed in the model. If any two 
inventive firms were completely unconnected in their technological environment, such 
that any firm could not benefit from knowledge created in other inventive firms, there 
would be no possibility of growth of knowledge in the economy. On the other hand, if 
every inventive firm were somehow completely unable of storing the new knowledge it 
created with its own research effort, there would be no possibility of growth of 
knowledge as well. 
The individual production function (F) is an increasing function of its two knowledge 
components or arguments. That (F) is increasing in its second argument reflects the 
existence of positive knowledge spillovers across inventive firms within their 
innovation system; that (F) is increasing in its first argument reflects the existence of 
  4positive, intertemporal knowledge spillovers within each inventive firm. Thus 
contemporaneous externalities are an increasing function of N at a given time t, whereas 
intertemporal externalities are increasing in t. Overall, the output of new designs and 
ideas produced by an individual research unit is a deterministic function increasing in 
time t.  
The characterization in the present model of the magnitude and impact of diachronic 
and synchronic complementarities by two single parameters is elegant and simple, but 
as always this comes at the expense of some realism. Presumably, this convenient 
analytical formulation has the advantage that it makes little difference on the answering 
of two important questions: In what direction and to what extent will synchronic 
complementarities affect the rate of growth of knowledge? And what are the sign and 
the extent of the impact of diachronic complementarities on the growth rate of the 
economy? 
We realistically allow for the possibility of knowledge depreciation and obsolescence of 
old ideas in the specification of the process by which knowledge accumulates. 
Knowledge can be stored although subject to depreciation and to obsolescence. The 
depreciation of the stock of knowledge takes place when people forget or let skills 
deteriorate. Technological obsolescence takes place when new knowledge comes along 
to supersede it. Old knowledge eventually is made obsolete by the emergence of newer, 
superior knowledge. These new ideas make the knowledge represented by the current 
stock of ideas less relevant in the production of new knowledge. 
Thus the extent of knowledge externalities within research units is determined by the 
diachronic complementarities parameter δ, which is assumed to be a positive constant 
strictly less than one.  
 
ASSUMPTION 1: The magnitude and impact of diachronic knowledge complementarities 
are represented by parameter δ, with 0 < δ < 1. 
 
For mathematical convenience, we consider a single, diachronic-complementarities 
multiplicative constant δ effectively accounting for the knowledge depreciation and 
technological obsolescence phenomena. Hence we assume that ideas and designs used 
at a given time are proportional to existing ideas and designs, so that only the portion 
δAi of the stock of knowledge Ai implicit in previous designs is actually accumulated 
within every research unit i. 
Researchers plausibly either have no free access to all flows of knowledge or are not 
capable of completely absorbing every new design or knowledge that has been created 
elsewhere in the economic system. Technological innovation takes place within a 
particular structure, a specific context of industrial products and production processes. 
Because technological knowledge is specific to each industry, region or firm, it becomes 
costly to use elsewhere, increases its appropriability and reduces its spontaneous 
circulation in the economic system (Antonelli, 1999).  
Thus the extent of knowledge spillovers across research units is determined by the 
synchronic complementarities parameter σ, which is assumed to be a positive constant 
strictly less than one.  
 
ASSUMPTION 2: The magnitude and impact of synchronic knowledge complementarities 
are represented by parameter σ, with 0 < σ < 1.  
 
For mathematical tractability, we consider only a specific, synchronic-
complementarities multiplicative constant σ indexing both the conditions and context 
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concerning the flow of knowledge component of the functional form for innovative 
output is that all knowledge spillover effects among inventive firms are 
contemporaneous with the current rate of invention. Hence there is production and 
“instantaneous” diffusion of the fraction σ of new knowledge and designs produced by 
research units within the local innovation system during the same period of time. And 
the intensity of contemporaneous externalities among N research firms enters the 
production function of new knowledge as  ∑ j j A & σ . Presumably our omission of a 
relatively short, time lag parameter revealing the delayed nature of other possible 
spillover effects among inventive firms will not change the basic analysis of synchronic 
complementarities and technological change at the aggregate level in the model.  
 
Diachronic and synchronic complementarities and their external effects enter the 
production function of new knowledge of each research unit as two multiplicative, 
knowledge components. Let parameters γ and μ measure the marginal productivity of 
each respective component. The extent to which each knowledge externality is relevant 
and of use to the production of new knowledge is given by each of these respective 
parameters. They are assumed to be positive constants strictly less than one. There is 
also an assumption of constant returns to the accumulation of new knowledge in the 
model: γ + μ = 1. Note that 0 < μ < 1 and μ + γ = 1 implies 0 < γ < 1. 
 
ASSUMPTION 3: Given knowledge productivity parameters γ and μ, with 0 < μ < 1 and μ 
+ γ = 1, the relative weight of synchronic knowledge complementarities over diachronic 
knowledge complementarities is represented by the parameter transformation ρ ≡ μ/γ, so 
that 0 < ρ < + ∞. 
 
Because of the assumptions of a flow of knowledge component and a stock of 
knowledge component contained in the common research technology specification, we 
are able to isolate and assess the relative importance of synchronic complementarities 
and diachronic complementarities on economic growth through the single, well-defined 
parameter transformation ρ.  
Each research unit views all current innovations and flows of knowledge developed by 
all research units as equally good technological substitutes for each other in the 
production of designs and knowledge. All new, different designs and contemporaneous 
flows of knowledge have essentially the same technological characteristics and are 
treated symmetrically in the functional form of the research technology of each research 
unit. 
Because of the symmetry in the model, the new ideas and designs of each and every 
research unit that become available at a given time are supplied at the same rate, 
henceforth denoted as  . Substituting   from the symmetric equilibrium 
condition   into the individual production function (F) and simplifying yield  
) (t Ai & ) (t Aj &
) ( ) ( t A t A i j & & =
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Let A(t) be the total stock of designs and knowledge in the economy. By definition, we 
have A(t) = NtAi(t). It follows immediately from (F) that the growth rate of Ai and also A 
is    . ) (
1 ρ ρ ρ δσ ϕ t N h g
+ =
  6Let H denote the aggregate level of human capital, HA, t denote the amount of human 
capital employed in research, and HY, t denote the amount of human capital devoted to 
final output. In Romer (1990) the consumers are endowed with fixed quantities of 
human capital, which can be used either in research or in the production of final-output 
goods. Instead Aghion and Howitt (1992) refer the mass of skilled labor, which can be 
used either in research or in the intermediate sector. In any case, these labor services are 
assumed to be essential inputs used most intensively in research. Back to Romer (1990), 
holders of human capital decide whether to work in the research sector or the 
manufacturing sector. This allocation of human capital between the research sector and 
the final-goods sector must be consistent with the requirements of a dynamic, general 
equilibrium for the Romer’s model. Nevertheless, the size of individual research firms 
is indeterminate in equilibrium. This is a common outcome in models of competition 
with constant returns to scale in human capital. The number and dimensions of research 
firms are indeterminate in the presence of constant returns to scale in the research lab 
combined with free entry in the research sector.  
Conversely, in the present model with diachronic and synchronic complementarities, we 
can infer the equilibrium number of research units once the equilibrium level HA is 
determined. We have assumed that every research firm employs the same research 
technology specification, and thus the same amount h of human capital. Accordingly, 
we can infer that the total number of active firms in the present model is N = HA/h. 
Earlier in this section, while describing the model with synchronic and diachronic 
complementarities, we took that any alternative number of research units is indivisible 
or “lumpy”. All the possible numbers of research units are thus all the positive integers 
and the number zero. Henceforth, the positive number N of research firms is assumed to 
be a continuous variable instead of a discrete one. Assuming that N  ≥ 1  becomes 
continuously variable, however, there must exist a continuum of numbers of research 
units – a different N for each alternative set of values HA and h which satisfies the 
equation N = HA/h. The remaining case is again one in which the number of research 
firms is zero, i.e., N = 0. 
Now we change variable to characterize the behavior of the research sector in the model 
with diachronic and synchronic complementarities. The aggregate variable HA is 
replaced by the optimization variable N. Sufficient conditions for a stationary, balance 
growth solution are derived below with respect to this new control variable. The formal 
specification used here emphasizes the importance of the sources of invention in the 
research process: the research firms. The number of distinct research firms producing 
different types of new designs and ideas is an important determinant of the equilibrium 
outcome and the rate of growth in the present model. 
Consequently, the appropriate measure of scale of the research sector is the number N of 
active research firms. Without loss of generality, set from this time on the common 
level  h = 1. Following from this relevant index for the scale of operation of the 
innovation network, the highest possible level of activity in the research sector is given 
by the maximum number of potential research units in the economy H, whereas the 
lowest possible level of activity in the research sector is, of course, simply N = 0. 
Following Aghion and Howitt (1998), it is argued that the model of endogenous growth 
through technological innovation in the present paper is completely described by both 
an arbitrage condition and a labor market clearing condition. The equilibrium condition 
for the research sector is called the arbitrage condition (a). It is assumed in Romer 
(1990) a competitive research sector, with any individual being free to engage in 
research activities. As a result the value of an hour of manufacturing must also be the 
wage rate paid to skilled workers in research. Reflecting this free allocation feature and 
  7conditional on the value of an hour in research, the arbitrage condition determines the 
amount of labor devoted to research activities, and so the number of research units.  
Let wt be the rental rate per unit of human capital or the wage rate of skilled labor, and 
PA be the price of new designs. Using the aggregate production function of new designs, 
Romer (1990) derives the equilibrium relation between wt and PA: wt = PA φA(t). Every 
research unit in the model with diachronic and synchronic knowledge 
complementarities faces the same research technology, or individual research function, 
and so the behavior of the research sector can be described in terms of a single research 
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Define the “productivity-adjusted (or growth-adjusted) wage rate” as ωt = wt/A(t). Thus 
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It is assumed in Romer (1990) that the final (or consumption) good sector is 
competitive, and is described by a single, aggregate, price-taking firm. The wage for 
human capital in the final-output sector is its marginal product  , ) (
1 1
,
β α β α α
− − −
t t Y x t A L H  
where  α and β are parameters of the aggregate production function, and  t x  is the 
aggregate demand for durables, which is a function of HY, t (and fixed quantity L) and is 
stationary in equilibrium. Define the “marginal product function” in the model with 
diachronic and synchronic knowledge complementarities as  ) ( ~
,t Y t H ω ω = . The 
marginal product function in this model is therefore  .
1 1
,
β α β α α ω
− − − = t t Y t x L H  
The equilibrium condition for the labor market is called the labor market condition (l). 
Society’s fixed stock of human capital or skilled labor H has two competing uses. 
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where   is the demand function for manufacturing labor. It is assumed a perfectly 
informed and flexible world in which the price variable rapidly equilibrates the labor 
market. Reflecting this frictionless feature, the labor market clearing condition 
determines the productivity-adjusted wage rate ω
Y H
~
t as function of the residual supply of 
manufacturing labor H – Nt,  ), (
~ 1
t Y t N H H − =
− ω  where   is the above function 
1 ~ −
Y H ω ~. 
Thus condition (l) can now be re-expressed as 
 
. ) (
1 1 β α β α α ω
− − − − = t t t x L N H          ( l )  
 
A stationary (or steady-state) equilibrium exhibits balanced growth, in the sense that 
allocation of skilled labor between research and manufacturing remains unchanged with 
each innovation. Given that the endogenous growth model is fully characterized by both 
  8conditions (a) and (l), a stationary equilibrium is simply defined as a stationary solution 
to system (a) and (l). Accordingly, a stationary equilibrium corresponds to both Nt ≡ N 
and ωt ≡ ω. 
Romer (1990)’s equation (8) says that the price PA of new designs must equal the 
present value of the net revenue that a monopolist producer of each specialized durable 
can extract, which is given by the ratio between a constant flow of profit and the interest 
rate r. After substituting PA from equation (8) into equation (a), the arbitrage and labor 
market clearing equations of the model in a steady-state just become 
 
, ) )( 1 (
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The equilibrium condition of the model determining the allocation of human capital 
between research (that is, the number of research units) and manufacturing states that 
the productivity-adjusted wage rate ω must be the same in both sectors. Then we easily 
see that equations (A) and (L) can be combined as 1 = Ψ(N):  
 
) (









β α β α
ϕ σ δ
ρ ρ ρ , for N ≥ 1. 
 
In a steady state the equilibrium research level N, whenever positive must satisfy the 
equation  1 =  Ψ(N). The Ψ(N) function is assumed to be continuous and to have 
continuous derivatives in the interval [1, H], and so we refer to it as a continuously 
differentiable function in that interval of its domain. The point N = 0 is also in the 
domain of the function: Ψ(0) = 0.   
To close the model, an assumption is required to ensure the existence of equilibrium 
with positive growth in the economy, while at the same time allowing for the possibility 
of multiple equilibria. That is, it remains to impose the relation between the Ψ(N) curve 
and the horizontal drawn at 1 for (neighboring values of) N = 1, with both δ and σ being 
set at the limit value 1. The possibility of dynamic, general equilibrium or equilibria 
with positive research will only be present in our model when the size of the economy is 
considerably large. The existence of stationary equilibrium or equilibria with positive 
growth also crucially depends on the size of the economy in Romer (1990), Murphy, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1989), and Young (1993).  
 
ASSUMPTION 4: The size of the economy as measured by the total amount of human 
capital or skilled labor H is very large. This means that the society’s fixed stock of 
human capital or skilled labor H satisfies both of the following conditions: 
(i)  ) (


















H , for ρ > 1. 
 
After Assumption 4, the model with diachronic and synchronic knowledge 
complementarities has the property that, for very large market sizes, the existence of at 
least one interior solution with positive research is possible. For an interior solution to 
  9actually exist, it is sufficient to impose restrictions on the parameters  δ,  σ, and ρ. 
Assumption 4(i) allow us to impose sufficient conditions on the product δσ, whereas 
Assumption 4(ii) allow us to establish sufficiency requirements on ρ. 
The model of endogenous economic growth is now entirely specified. This section has 
shown how a stationary equilibrium is determined in the economy as well. Next section 
answers the question of whether or not, or more precisely, under what conditions 




3. MAIN RESULTS 
 
One primary issue arising in economic analysis after the introduction of external effects 
is the potential for multiple equilibria, with all of the indeterminacies they involve. 
Typically externalities give rise to multiple equilibria with little guarantee that the 
inventive market will choose the best one. The equilibrium attained by the economy 
depends upon the expectations of inventors. 
Both multiple equilibria and indeterminacy exhibited in our model are created by the 
assumption of two types of knowledge complementarities: the diachronic 
complementarities and the synchronic complementarities. Multiple equilibria in the 
economy can only be revealed for values of the relative weight of synchronic 
complementarities over diachronic complementarities that are large enough, i.e., ρ > 1, 
which in turn means that the synchronic knowledge complementarities must be 
relatively more important than the diachronic knowledge complementarities: μ > 0.5. 
The next proposition states sufficient conditions under which there is more than one 
equilibrium outcome with positive research in the economy. Define NC(σ) to be the 
critical size of the inventive network given σ. Then it satisfies the condition φσN = 1. 
Hence the Ψ(N) curve shifts downward with increases in ρ whenever N < NC(σ), and 
shifts upward whenever N > NC(σ). Moreover the upper limit δσ (ρ) of product δσ and 
the limit ρ ~(δσ) of ρ, together with the critical value NM(δσ) of research units are all 
defined in the proof of this proposition (see Appendix). We can write the Ψ(N) curve as 
Ψ(N; δ, σ, ρ), which has four arguments instead of one: one endogenous variable and 
three exogenous variables. Then it can be shown that the Ψ(N; δ, σ, ρ) curve achieves a 
maximum when N = NM(δσ) and ρ = ρ ~(δσ).  
 
PROPOSITION I: Existence of a Dynamic, General Equilibrium with Positive Growth: 
Multiplicity of Equilibria.  
There exist two general equilibria (interior solutions) in the economy if the following 
conditions hold: 
δσ ≤ δσ (ρ) < 1,  
and  
ρ ~(δσ) ≥ ρ > 1 whenever NM(δσ) ≤ NC(σ), 
ρ > ρ ~(δσ) > 1 whenever NM(δσ) > NC(σ).  
 
PROOF: See Appendix. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates some of the different types of equilibria that might arise in the 
model. Given the inverted U-shape of the Ψ(N) curve, we then get a multiplicity of 
steady-state growth paths. For sufficiently small values of the knowledge 
  10complementarities parameters δ and σ, the Ψ(N) curve cuts the horizontal line drawn at 
1 twice, and two steady states with innovation exist: a low growth steady state, and a 
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FIGURE 1: Illustration of the multiple general equilibria (NL) and (NH), the possibility of 
a threshold effect (NT), and the issue of equilibrium stability (direction of arrows).  
 
There are two equilibrium outcomes with positive research, NL and NH. While NL is 
labeled the low-research equilibrium, NH is the high-research equilibrium. Note that this 
figure also depicts a stagnant, no-growth equilibrium outcome. For sufficiently small 
values of δ and σ, given ρ > 1, the model possesses three steady states: a stagnant, no-
research trap, and those two interior solutions already referred to. The selection of an 
equilibrium is then crucially dependent upon the coordination of expectations. 
For intermediate levels of diachronic and synchronic knowledge complementarities, the 
model reveals important discontinuities in its parameters, as long as the relative weight 
of synchronic complementarities over diachronic complementarities is greater than one. 
In particular, a threshold effect exists in which small parameters changes may 
drastically transform the opportunity set of a stagnant economy by creating an 
additional, high growth equilibrium. 
 
COROLLARY I: Equilibrium Discontinuity and a Threshold Effect. 
Suppose that the relative weight of synchronic complementarities over diachronic 
complementarities is ρ > 1. When the Ψ(N) curve lies slightly below the horizontal line 
at 1, small increases in the diachronic and/or synchronic knowledge complementarities 
parameters  δ and σ, respectively, can discontinuously enlarge the economy’s 
opportunity set of a stagnant economy by allowing the Ψ(N)  curve to attain a tangency 
with the horizontal line drawn at 1 and, given the appropriate modification of 
expectations, leading to a drastic transition from economic stagnation to rapid growth. 
Hence the sudden emergency of this high growth equilibrium generates an important 
threshold effect. 
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i.e., at the equilibrium number of research units NT in the figure 1 above, a positive 
growth rate suddenly appears. This is because knowledge externalities may generate 
situations in which research firms find it profitable to undertake an investment in new 
technology only when other research firms do so too. For sufficiently large values of δ 
and σ given ρ > 1, the apex of the Ψ(N) curve in figure 1 attains a tangency with 
horizontal line drawn at 1, which, along with the stagnant steady state (where N = 0), 
constitutes a potential steady-state equilibrium. The economy’s equilibrium rate of 
growth will then depend upon whether inventors are pessimistic or optimistic about 
future rates of inventive activity. 
We will now restrict attention to cases in which there is a unique steady-state 
equilibrium. This model also exhibits the usual single equilibrium outcome for a given 
set of parameters. Traditional models of endogenous growth and invention, such as 
Romer (1990), where only one steady-state equilibrium exists, correspond to this special 
situation. Then there is no indeterminacy in the model and the economy´s growth rate is 
not dependent upon any coordination of expectations. 
The model has the property that for very large values of the diachronic and synchronic 
knowledge complementarities parameters δ and σ, respectively, given any value taken 
by the relative weight of synchronic complementarities over diachronic 
complementarities ρ, only one, unique general equilibrium with innovation exists. The 
following proposition states sufficient conditions under which there exists such an 
equilibrium outcome in the economy. 
 
PROPOSITION II: Existence of a Dynamic, General Equilibrium with Positive Growth: 
Uniqueness of Equilibrium. 
There exists a unique, general equilibrium (interior solution) in the economy if the 
following conditions hold: 
1 > δσ ≥ δσ (ρ) 
and 
0 < ρ ≤ ρ (δσ). 
 
PROOF: See Appendix. 
 
For very large values of δ and σ, it is clear from examination of figure 2 that Ψ(1) is 
greater than one, and consequently, Ψ(N) cuts the horizontal line at 1 only once, from 
above. In this case, where each research firm can easily recoup the cost of invention, 
there is only one unique steady-state equilibrium. This is an equilibrium in which the 
Ψ(N) curve depicted in figure 2 cuts the horizontal line at 1 from above, because the 
former curve has a negative slope given our assumption that ρ < 1. 
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FIGURE 2: Illustration of the unique general equilibrium (NU), given ρ < 1, and the 
stagnant, zero-growth equilibrium (N0 = 0). 
 
The danger of no interior solution for the economy was ruled out once large enough 
knowledge complementarities have been assumed to exist in the first place. In this case 
of a unique stationary equilibrium, economic growth is positive because innovations 
arrive at a positive rate as NU > 0. 
However, there is also a real possibility of complete market collapse in which no 
research unit produces positive inventive output. The potential problem is that no 
research unit would be willing to spend time and effort necessary to produce inventions 
unless it was sure that there was going to be sufficient rewards to be reaped. 
Particularly, in an inventive market exhibiting rather weak knowledge 
complementarities and external effects, potential research units are understandably 
reluctant to join the innovation network because there is no assurance that there will be 
any number at all of active research units operating in the market. The possibility that 
the particular equilibrium outcome is one in which no one has joined the research 
network is formally stated in the next corollary. 
 
COROLLARY II: Equilibrium (Interior Solution) Inexistence and the Zero-Growth 
Equilibrium Outcome. 
Let the relative weight of synchronic complementarities over diachronic 
complementarities take any value ρ. When the Ψ(N) curve lies everywhere below the 
horizontal line drawn at 1, the profit flow accruing to innovators is insufficient to justify 
their research cost regardless of the number N of research units and thereby the rate of 
innovation in the economy. In this case the only steady state is the stagnant equilibrium 
with no innovation N0 = 0. That is, no general equilibrium with a positive number of 
research units exists, and consequently there will be no growth in the economy. 
 
For very small values of δ and σ, the Ψ(N) curve lies below the horizontal line at 1 for 
all positive number N, as depicted in figure 2 above for a given ρ < 1. In the absence of 
extensive knowledge complementarities, the inventive market expected to be faced by 
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simply fail and the innovative network will not be viable. If no interior solution exists, 
then the only equilibrium level of research activity is zero. Hence, for either very small 
or very large levels of δ and σ, the model behaves exactly like a standard model of 
invention and endogenous growth. In both cases, there exists a unique steady-state 
growth rate in the economy. 
The first proposition above makes clear that there might exist multiple steady state 
equilibria. Which of these general equilibria might we expect to occur in the economy? 
The next proposition shows that, although the no-research trap and the high research 
steady state are both stable, the intermediate, low research steady state is unstable. We 
argue that the high research or NH equilibrium is stable, and hence we are lead to 
conclude that it is the most likely candidate for a long-run equilibrium with innovation. 
The low-research or NL equilibrium is unstable and so there is no guarantee that the 
inventive market will choose the right one, i.e., the high research steady state. 
The problem of equilibrium selection is an issue that models of endogenous growth 
which are built around external effects or externalities must surely confront. Allowing 
for knowledge externalities creates the possibility of multiple equilibria; the equilibrium 
indeterminacy is therefore created by the knowledge complementarities of the model.  
However, equilibrium selection is a nontrivial problem. The analysis of the stability of 
different equilibria, both with complete and incomplete information, has been used to 
develop opinions and draw conclusions as to the equilibrium most likely to prevail in 
practice.  
 
PROPOSITION III: Equilibrium Indeterminacy and Instability, and Not Reaching Critical 
Mass. 
In a multiple equilibrium setting, the stagnant, no growth equilibrium (N0 = 0) and the 
general equilibrium NH are both stable, whereas the general equilibrium NL is unstable.  
The general equilibrium NL is unstable and so, whenever the installed base of current 
research units is below the critical mass for the network, NL, the alternative and worse 
equilibrium outcome that arises is one in which there is no research, i.e., N0 = 0. The 
other alternative outcome, which is a real possibility for the invention market whenever 
more than NL research units have joined the innovation network, is the high-research, or 
NH equilibrium. 
 
PROOF: See Appendix. 
 
Any analysis of dynamics will help select an equilibrium so long as it can be used to 
determine the stability and instability of different steady states. The implications drawn 
from an analysis of “dynamics” with full information, self-fulfilling expectations and 
positive feedback as a means of choosing among multiple equilibria in our model are 
shown below in the proof of this proposition.  
The dynamics of the process of knowledge accumulation could take the following form. 
If the current number of research firms has insufficiently invested in R&D, and 
therefore N < NL, investing in R&D tends to become unattractive for (potential) research 
firms next period as well, hence the possibility of a low-growth path where in all 
successive periods research firms invest too little in R&D. Along this low-growth path, 
insufficient investment in R&D in the past discourages further knowledge acquisition 
and thereby future growth. 
Positive feedback makes the strong get stronger, and so as the number of research units 
grow, more and more research units find joining the innovation network worthwhile. 
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installed base of research units. In this danger zone consisting of those numbers of 
research units below the critical mass, “the strong gets stronger” is replaced by “the 
weak gets weaker” and the virtuous cycle of growth is changed to a vicious cycle of 
collapse. 
Going back to figure 1 above, it is suggested there through arrows pointing in opposite 
directions but always starting from the critical mass for the innovation network NL 
where the network will probably grow to attain the high value of research units NH, and 
where the network will probably fail. 
We should note, however, that these results about the stability and instability of the 
different steady states of the model are extraordinary dependent upon the selection of 
the production function of new knowledge. For example, with CES production 
functions with an infinite elasticity of substitution, in a multiple equilibria scenario, the 
conclusions are apparently the reverse of those shown above: the low-growth 
equilibrium becomes stable, whereas the high-growth equilibrium is the instable one. 
We explore further the implications of knowledge complementarities for general 
equilibrium (equilibria) and economic growth by conducting now a thorough 
comparative-static exercise. Note that only qualitative conclusions will be drawn from 
changing exogenous parameters and parameter transformations in this analysis. 
 
PROPOSITION IV: Comparative-Static Analysis. 
An infinitesimal change in every parameter and parameter transformation δ, σ, and ρ 
whenever an equilibrium number of research units is greater than NC(σ), associated 
respectively to diachronic knowledge complementarities, synchronic knowledge 
complementarities, and the relative weight of synchronic complementarities over 
diachronic complementarities, will change equilibrium values (concerning numbers of 
research units): 
(i) NH and NU all in the same direction, which is that of the parameter’s change; 
(ii)  NL in the opposite direction, with NL changing in the opposite direction of the 
parameter’s change. 
However, an infinitesimal change in parameter transformation ρ whenever an 
equilibrium number of research units is smaller than NC(σ) will have reversed effects. In 
this case, a small change in the relative weight of synchronic complementarities over 
diachronic complementarities will change equilibrium values: 
(iii) NL in the same direction, which is that of the parameter’s change; 
(iv) NH and NU all in the opposite direction, with NH and NU changing in the opposite 
direction of the parameter’s change. 
 
PROOF: See Appendix. 
 
The next figure illustrates through a minor shift upward of the Ψ(N) curve, and so of the 
curve corresponding to condition (A), what has just been stated regarding knowledge 
complementarities effects or impact upon multiple general equilibria values. Note that 
the relationship between conditions (A) and (L) which fully characterize the model of 
endogenous growth with innovation can in turn be depicted in a (N, ω) plane.  
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FIGURE 3: Illustration of the impact of small increases in the extent of knowledge 
complementarities and their relative weight, with NC(σ) < NL < NH, on the multiple 
general equilibria NL and NH. 
 
Using this figure, we easily see that the equilibrium level of research activity NL will be 
lowered by a higher δ, a higher σ, and a higher ρ if NH > NC(σ). Moreover, the larger the 
diachronic knowledge complementarities and the synchronic knowledge 
complementarities, the larger the equilibrium level of research NH and therefore the 
larger the growth rate in the economy. 
Interestingly, in the multiple equilibrium case, the two steady states display completely 
opposite comparative properties. A small increase in δ, σ, or ρ if NH > NC(σ),  raises the 
number of research units in the high growth steady state and therefore the value of the 
high growth rate, while lowering the number of research units in the low growth steady 
state and the associated value of the low growth rate. These comparative-statics results 
are all intuitive to a great extent. If one raises the return to an endogenous activity like 
innovation in a situation in which the payoff to economic agents is locally decreasing in 
the level of research activity, then a return to equilibrium will require an increase in 
their level of activity. However, if the payoff to the economic agents is locally 
increasing in the level of research activity N, as is the case near the low growth steady 
state, then a return to equilibrium requires a paradoxical reduction in their level of 
activity. Therefore there is a perverse comparative static implication of the low growth 
steady state. Additionally, note that the contrasting comparative statics properties of the 
different equilibria of this model highlight the importance of equilibrium selection. 
 
 
4. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The previous section has pointed out that knowledge externalities can be a source of 
market imperfections and have the potential effect of discouraging R&D investments. 
This in turn suggests a motivation and role for public intervention in the R&D sector. 
Governments will increase the level of inventive activity and the rate of innovation in 
  16the economy not only by actively financing R&D activities but also through innovative 
policies designed to enhance knowledge complementarities within local innovation 
systems.  
Innovative policies can have a significant impact upon knowledge spillovers and 
economic growth by affecting the relevant contextual conditions for technological 
transfer. Real world innovation systems are characterized by imperfect knowledge 
spillovers. Some of the important channels of technological knowledge communication 
among firms are patent disclosure, movements of personnel between firms, professional 
meetings, input suppliers and customers. With imperfect knowledge spillovers, the 
communication of ideas and inventions, their development and the final comparative 
advantage of innovative firms become endogenous to the local innovation system. That 
is, the channels and networks through which ideas and inventions circulate are 
embedded in a political, social and institutional background that facilitates or constrains 
innovation. Therefore any deliberate, publicly designed improvements of those external 
institutions which are an integral part of innovation systems will necessarily influence 
innovative activities of firms.  
Note that another important instrument of policy intervention in the R&D sector is 
subsidizing R&D activities. Government subsidies to R&D will increase the 
profitability of R&D activities, and thereby speed up technological progress. We think 
this is another important policy prescription that might emerge from our model which is 
built upon the representative inventive agent assumption. 
The model of endogenous growth presented in this paper possesses an interesting range 
of equilibria, including threshold effects, where small policies might have large 
consequences. The steady state growth rates of the model are discontinuous in its 
parameters. Hence, small policy interventions, such as those designed to increase 
knowledge complementarities within a local innovation system, can have small, positive 
effects on the equilibrium growth rate as well as dramatically enlarge the inventive 
opportunity set of the economy and lead to a dramatic transition from no-growth to 
rapid growth. 
Last section has established the possibility of multiple steady states with innovation, the 
low research equilibrium and the high research equilibrium. Since each of these 
equilibria display different comparative static properties, the implications of small 
parameters changes or policy actions are dependent upon which equilibrium is selected. 
On this issue of equilibrium selection, however, last section has also established that the 
high research equilibrium is stable while the low research equilibrium is actually 
unstable. Moreover other stable equilibrium exists in this multiple equilibrium setting: 
the no-growth equilibrium with no innovation. 
An important question is whether and how the technology and the innovative network 
can reach the critical mass and get started. On this regard, the latter diagram suggests 
through its arrows pointing in opposite directions why knowledge complementarities 
have a growth-enhancing value. Greater positive economic growth rates are more likely 
to take place in inventive markets exhibiting stronger knowledge externalities and in 
research networks enjoying more extensive knowledge complementarities. 
 
COROLLARY III: Knowledge Complementarities Effects on General Equilibria and 
Getting the Network Started. 
In a multiple equilibria (interior solution) setting, there are two sorts of positive effects 
on initial dynamic general equilibria NL and NH, and therefore on the rate of economic 
growth, of diachronic knowledge complementarities, synchronic knowledge 
complementarities, and the relative weight of synchronic complementarities over 
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greater than NC(σ): 
(i) Direct effects: by increasing NH, increases in δ, σ, and ρ raise the level of innovative 
activity which speeds up growth. 
(ii) Indirect effects: by lowering NL, increases in δ, σ, and ρ work as a tool that makes it 
more likely to ignite the positive feedback which translates into rapid growth. 
However, the relative weight of synchronic complementarities over diachronic 
complementarities whenever an equilibrium number of research units is smaller than 
NC(σ) also has reversed, negative effects on the ultimate level of research activity and 
economic growth: 
(iii) Direct effects: by decreasing NH, increases in ρ lower the level of innovative 
activity which reduces growth. 
(iv) Indirect effects: by increasing NL, increases in ρ make it less likely to ignite the 
positive feedback which would translate into rapid growth. 
 
Knowledge complementarities can have both so-called direct and indirect effects. As to 
direct effects to start with, increases in the equilibrium value of research units NH due to 
stronger diachronic or synchronic technological complementarities directly affect the 
speed of growth in an economy, as the growth rate is a strictly increasing function of 
research units. 
The policy implications related to these so-called direct effects of knowledge 
complementarities and drawn from the earlier comparative-statics exercise are clear. 
Technology policy by means of strengthening technological complementarities can 
conceivably be effective in inducing higher innovative performance in the local 
innovation system and promoting higher sustained growth in the economy. Small policy 
interventions directed to strengthen technological complementarities, i.e., increasing δ 
and/or σ, can have small and continuous effects on the equilibrium growth rate of the 
economy. 
Corollary III also highlights so-called indirect effects and how the assumption of self-
fulfilling beliefs can be useful. Assume that the current number of firms N is smaller 
than the critical mass NL. Under such conditions, getting NH research units to operate in 
the inventive market is likely to be difficult unless the critical mass is reached by N. The 
key challenge facing society here is therefore to somehow obtain more easily critical 
mass necessary to get an innovative network started. Knowledge complementarities can 
actually act as a mechanism that enables an economy to lower the critical mass itself. 
That is, a way for the economy to achieve strong and sustainable growth is through 
stronger knowledge complementarities which in turn will lower its critical mass. 
Therefore, small policy interventions designed to raise knowledge complementarities, 
i.e., to increase δ and/or σ, can conceivably reduce the critical mass of the innovation 
network as well. Thus for a given value of N, the current number of research units, the 
low research equilibrium will eventually occur to the left of N. In this case, the behavior 
of research units is changed because the positive feedback associated with network 
externalities change the expectations of potential research units regarding the value to 
them of joining the innovative network. And self-fulfilling expectations are one 
manifestation of positive-feedback economics. Hence, due to the multiplicity of 
stationary equilibria of the model, a technology policy enlarging knowledge 
complementarities can have positive effects on economic growth by affecting not only 
the high research equilibrium but also the low research equilibrium.   
Finally, the effects of small changes in the relative weight of synchronic 
complementarities over diachronic complementarities ρ on innovation and growth are 
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innovative and economic performance depends on the underlying structure of the 
economy – specifically, on the equilibrium size of the inventive network relative to its 
critical size NC(σ). Indeed, increases (or, for that matter, decreases) in ρ will have 
reversed effects on technological change and growth depending on the magnitude of the 
inventive network relative to its critical size. Until NC(σ) is reached, further increases in 
ρ will reduce the growth rate, but beyond that point it will raise the growth rate. 
The model has an important policy implication regarding small changes in the relative 
weight of synchronic complementarities over diachronic complementarities. There is 
not a simple, clear-cut technology policy designed to change ρ in a unique direction that 
always enables innovation authorities to push the high research equilibrium NH forward 
and to force the economy back to the high research equilibrium whenever it finds itself 
below the critical mass NL. In particular, the effects of network policies designed to 
increase the relative productivity of synchronic complementarities and networks over 
synchronic complementarities and firms, as measured by ρ, whenever an equilibrium 
number of research units in the economy is smaller than the critical size of the network, 
are decidedly perverse. 
The following figure depicts the worst-case-scenario for any government policy aimed 
at encouraging innovation and boosting growth by relying heavily on raising the relative 
productivity  ρ.  Such a policy will turn out to be counterproductive because both 
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FIGURE 4: Illustration of the impact of small increases in the relative weight of 
knowledge complementarities, with NL < NH < NC(σ), on the multiple general equilibria 
NL and NH. 
 
Contrary to the scenario depicted in figure 3, where a higher relative productivity of 
networks ρ has a boosting effect on innovation and thereby on economic growth, a 
higher ρ, for example induced by network policy, may also slow down innovation and 
growth. This is because the rate of growth depends upon both networks and firms and, 
  19as depicted in figure 4 above, the equilibrium level of research activity is small 
compared to the critical size of the network. Under constant returns to scale in the 
production of new technology, the level of productivity of networks μ can only be 
pushed at the expense of the productivity of firms γ, as by definition γ = 1 – μ. Having 
too little firms operating in the inventive network can make such productivity growth 
sterile if not counterproductive. Such kind of policy gives little chance or benefit of 
inventive entrepreneurs to learn from diachronic knowledge complementarities. In this 





The present extension of Romer (1990) emphasizes knowledge spillovers across 
inventive firms as important elements of the growth process. It must be acknowledge 
that both intertemporal knowledge externalities and contemporaneous knowledge 
externalities allow for a much richer characterization of the growth process. It is the 
introduction of contemporaneous knowledge externalities that creates the multiple 
equilibria and threshold effects which are inherent to this model. Another advantage of 
this theoretical formulation incorporating some degree of contemporaneous spillovers is 
that it allows for an analysis of the effects on steady-state growth of a variety of 




PROOF OF PROPOSITION I:  
Define  ) , , ; (
~
ρ σ δ N Ψ  = (δσ)
ρ Ψ(N; 1, 1, ρ). By construction,  ) , , ; (
~
ρ σ δ N Ψ  < Ψ(N; δ, σ, 
ρ) as (δσ)
ρ < δσ
ρ,  given that δ < 1 (by Assumption 1) so long as ρ > 1 (possible by 
Assumption 3). Let N* = arg max Ψ(N; 1, 1, ρ). Hence N*(ρ) = [(ρ – 1)/ρ]H, which is 
positive if ρ > 1, and, by Assumption 4(ii), is actually greater than one.  
There may exist a solution ρ ~ > 1 to the equation 1 =  ) , , ); ( * (
~
ρ σ δ ρ N Ψ , where the 
function representing its right-hand side is defined for given product δσ. Suppose that 
such an equation does indeed define the implicit function ρ ~(δσ). This implicit function 
can in turn be used to define NM(δσ) = N*(ρ ~(δσ)). Then 1 < Ψ(NM(δσ); δ, σ,  ρ ~(δσ)). 
Hence 1 < Ψ(NM(δσ); δ, σ, ρ) for ρ ≤ ρ ~(δσ) whenever NM(δσ) ≤ NC(σ) and for ρ > ρ ~(δσ) 
whenever NM(δσ) > NC(σ). This is because Ψ(N; δ, σ, ρ) shifts upward in the vicinity of 
N with decreases (increases) in ρ whenever φσN <(>) 1, i.e, whenever N <(>) NC(σ). 
And Ψ(N; δ, σ, ρ) does not move at N = NC(σ). 
Moreover, we have 1 > Ψ(H; δ, σ, ρ) = 0 for every parameter δ, σ, and ρ as H – N = 0, 
where N = H > NM(δσ). Now we need to show that, for a sufficiently low product δσ 
given ρ, 1 > Ψ(1; δ, σ, ρ). Define δσ (ρ) = 1/Ψ(1; 1, 1, ρ). That is, δσ (ρ) = G(ρ)/(H – 
1) which, by Assumption 4(i), is strictly less than one. By construction, δσ (ρ) Ψ(1; 1, 
1, ρ) > δσ
ρ Ψ(1; 1, 1, ρ) as δσ (ρ) > δσ
ρ, given that σ < 1 (by Assumption 2) and ρ > 1 
so long as δσ = δσ (ρ). Hence 1 > Ψ(1; δ, σ, ρ) for δσ ≤ δσ (ρ), where N = 1. 
Finally, by appealing to the continuity of the Ψ(N) function in the interval [1, H] once 
all the above sufficiency requirements on δσ and ρ are met, it should suffice to establish 
that the graph of the Ψ(N) function cuts the horizontal line at 1 twice (therefore, 
implying the existence of two interior solutions with positive research). 
 
  20PROOF OF PROPOSITION II:  
Define  ) , , ; 1 ( ρ σ δ Ψ  to be (δσ)
 Ψ(1; 1, 1, ρ) for ρ ≤ 1 (possible by Assumption 3), and 
(δσ)
ρ Ψ(1; 1, 1, ρ) for ρ > 1 (also possible by Assumption 3). Note that the  ) , , ; 1 ( ρ σ δ Ψ  
function, which has two branches, is continuous at ρ = 1. By construction,  ) , , ; 1 ( ρ σ δ Ψ  
≤  Ψ(1;  δ,  σ,  ρ) as δσ  ≤  δσ
ρ, given that σ < 1 (by Assumption 2) and ρ  ≤ 1 , and 
) , , ; 1 ( ρ σ δ Ψ  < Ψ(1; δ, σ, ρ) as (δσ)
ρ ≤ δσ
ρ, given that δ < 1 (by Assumption 1) and ρ > 
1. 
An implicit function ρ (δσ) may be implied by the equation 1 =  ) , , ; 1 ( ρ σ δ Ψ . Suppose 
that such an equation does indeed define that implicit function for given product δσ. 
Then 1 ≤ Ψ(1; δ, σ,  ρ (δσ)). Note that ∂Ψ(1; δ, σ, ρ)/∂ρ < 0 as N = 1 < NC(σ) = 1/(φσ), 
given that 0 < φ < 1 and, by Assumption 2, 0 < σ < 1. Hence 1 ≤ Ψ(1; δ, σ, ρ) for ρ ≤ 
ρ (δσ). 
Define δσ (ρ) to be 1/Ψ(1; 1, 1, ρ) for ρ ≤ 1, and [1/Ψ(1; 1, 1, ρ)]
1/ρ for ρ > 1. That is, 
δσ (ρ) = G(ρ)/(H – 1) for ρ ≤ 1, and δσ (ρ) = [G(ρ)/(H – 1)]
1/ρ for ρ > 1 which, by 
Assumption 4(i), are strictly less than one. Note that the δσ (ρ) function with two 
branches is continuous at ρ = 1. By construction, for ρ ≤ 1, δσ (ρ) Ψ(1; 1, 1, ρ) ≤ δσ
ρ 
Ψ(1; 1, 1, ρ) as δσ (ρ) ≤ δσ
ρ, given that σ < 1 so long as δσ = δσ (ρ), and for ρ > 1, 
[δσ (ρ)]
ρ Ψ(1; 1, 1, ρ) < δσ
ρ Ψ(1; 1, 1, ρ) as [δσ (ρ)]
ρ < δσ
ρ, given that δ < 1 so long as 
δσ = δσ (ρ). Hence 1 ≤ Ψ(1; δ, σ, ρ) for δσ ≥ δσ (ρ).  
We also have 1 > Ψ(H; δ, σ, ρ) = 0 for every parameter δ, σ, and ρ. The same inequality 
also holds true at least for other numbers of research units in the neighborhood of N = 
H. 
Under the sufficiency conditions imposed above on δσ and ρ, together with the 
continuity property of the Ψ(N) function in the interval [1, H], we can be sure that the 
graph of the Ψ(N) function cuts the horizontal line at 1 only once (therefore, implying 
the existence of one interior solution with positive research). 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION III:  
Starting from a general equilibrium with a small number of research units as NL, 
consider for example the effect of a small loss in the number of current research units on 
the dynamic behavior of the model. As a few research units leave the innovation 
network, the expected value of being part of the technological system for those 
remaining in the network is reduced. In fact, this loss would decrease the value of the 
innovation network below the opportunity cost of joining the network of all research 
units in the interval [1, NL), as the curve corresponding to condition (A) lies below the 
curve corresponding to condition (L) and, accordingly, the Ψ(N) curve lies below the 
horizontal line at 1 in Figure 1. The eventual outcome is that all research units leave the 
market (that is to say, N goes down to zero) and the network fails. Starting again from 
the low-research equilibrium, consider now the effect of a small increase in the number 
of research units. This would increase the expected value of the network above the 
opportunity cost for all research units in the interval (NL, NH). The positive feedback 
associated with network externalities change the expectations regarding the value of 
joining the innovation network. This would in turn certainly lead to the establishment of 
the high-research, or NH equilibrium. 
 
 
  21PROOF OF PROPOSITION IV:  
The equilibrium position of the economy is defined by the general equilibrium 
condition 1 = Ψ(N; δ, σ, ρ) which, upon rearrangement, can be expressed by 1 – Ψ(N; δ, 
σ, ρ) = 0. 
To find how an infinitesimal change in the parameter σ will affect the single equilibrium 
value  NU, one has to differentiate partially the general equilibrium condition with 














The sign of this partial derivative is determined by the sign of its denominator, as by 
virtue of the assumptions of the model the first derivative of the curve corresponding to 
condition (A) w.r.t. σ is strictly positive and, accordingly, ∂Ψ/∂σ > 0. Hence, as this is 






. Note that only qualitative conclusions will be drawn here. Likewise, in a 
multiple equilibrium setting at the high growth equilibrium NH, as the Ψ(N; δ, σ, ρ) 





. However, taking 
into account that the Ψ(N; δ, σ, ρ) curve might also intercept the horizontal line at 1 
from below, as it does at the equilibrium number of firms NL, these same arguments lead 






Similar arguments to those above can be developed to draw additional qualitative 
conclusions: the first derivative of the curve corresponding to condition (A) w.r.t. δ is 
















Furthermore, the first derivative of the curve corresponding to condition (A) w.r.t. ρ is 
strictly positive and ∂Ψ/∂ρ > 0 whenever φσN > 1, which happens by definition of 
















. However, the first derivative of the arbitrage curve w.r.t. ρ is 
strictly negative whenever N < NC(σ), hence reversing the sign of every such 
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￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 8 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿& ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿9   : $ ￿ ￿￿& ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿  2 $ ￿ ￿￿0￿ "￿ ￿   ￿￿￿￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿- ￿, ￿￿￿￿￿5 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿6 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿6￿ ￿ ￿ "’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ;￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿6￿ ￿￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ < ￿ ￿￿= ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿6￿ ￿￿ ￿￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿ ￿ ￿ "’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿0￿ ￿   ￿ ￿= ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ . ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/￿ ￿/# ￿ $ % ￿￿￿￿* ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿ ￿ ￿ "’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿ * ￿ ￿ $ ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿7 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿8 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿( ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿8 ￿￿￿￿
) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿ ￿ ￿ "’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ $ "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿# ￿￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿,￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ $ % ￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
% ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ( ￿7 ￿ ￿￿/ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿7 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
9 3 ￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿/ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ % ￿ "’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ $ "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿   > ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿,￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ $ % ￿￿￿￿3 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ( ￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿/ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿/ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ % ￿ "’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿? ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿￿ ￿= ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿6 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
9 ￿   ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿7 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿8 ￿￿ ￿￿￿: ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿9 ￿   ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿1 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6￿% ￿ ( ￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿% ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿9 ￿   ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿3 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿= ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿* ￿￿￿) , ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿/ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿9 ￿   ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿8 ￿
0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿,￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿! ￿ $ ￿￿0￿￿ $ ￿ ￿= ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿) ￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿- ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿ ￿
0 ￿￿￿6 ￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿9 ￿   ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿;￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿7 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ , ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿ 8 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿9 ￿   ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿ , ￿; ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿8 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿/ ￿￿￿< = ￿￿> ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿? ￿￿￿￿￿￿/ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿￿@ ￿￿￿￿( ￿* ￿￿￿7 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% $ ￿ ￿￿; , ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿9 ￿   ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿# ￿￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ $ "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿A ￿) ￿$ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿ ￿   ￿ "’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ $ "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿6 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿B￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/ C 8 ￿￿￿# ￿ ￿   ￿ "’ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
0￿￿ $ ￿￿￿￿   ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿   > ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿= ￿ ￿￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿   > ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ A ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿7 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 8 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿$ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿#￿￿ ￿￿￿
# ￿ ￿   ￿ "’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿￿0￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿ ￿   ￿ "’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ 1 ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿￿0￿ ￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿ ￿   ￿ "’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿￿￿￿￿ 1 1 ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿,￿ ￿￿￿D￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿E￿) ￿" ￿￿￿= ￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿B ￿￿   ￿0￿ ￿ C ￿ ￿￿ < ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ < ￿
& ￿ 0D ￿ ￿ & ￿ 0/￿￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿,￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿* ￿ "￿ ￿   E ￿￿￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ 1 3 ￿
+ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿# ￿ < ￿ ￿￿= ￿ # ￿ 6￿ ￿￿ ￿￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ . ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/￿ ￿/# ￿ $ % ￿￿￿￿7 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ 1 8 ￿
) ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿# ￿ ￿+ ￿$ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿,￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿6 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ 1 ;￿
0￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿,￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿7 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 / ’ ( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿, ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ 1 ￿￿
￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿% ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿8 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿ $ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ 1 ￿￿
0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿,￿ ￿ ￿￿￿C ￿ ￿ ￿￿! ￿ $ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿7 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿F ￿￿#￿￿￿￿ ￿￿8 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿- ￿, ￿
% $ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿- ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿ $ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ 1 ￿ ￿
& ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ : ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿0 ￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿, ￿￿ ￿G ￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿) ￿ $ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ 1 ￿￿
0￿￿ $ ￿￿￿￿   ￿ F ￿￿ ￿   > ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿= ￿ ￿￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿   > ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ A ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿7 ￿ ￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
8 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿$ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ 1 ￿ ￿
9 ￿   2 % ￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿0￿￿ $ ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿ "￿￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿6￿ ￿ * $ ￿￿ ￿G￿ ￿ ￿ H￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿: ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
8 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿8 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ 3 ￿￿
) ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿# ￿ ￿+ ￿$ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ 3 1 ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿/ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿#￿￿ ￿￿￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ 3 3 ￿
4 ￿ 5 ￿ ￿6￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿1 ￿￿+ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/ ￿$ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿3 ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
1 ￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿) ￿’ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ 3 8 ￿
0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿,￿ ￿ ￿￿￿C ￿ ￿ ￿￿! ￿ $ ￿￿￿’ ￿￿ ￿￿6 ￿￿￿3 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿￿￿￿
8 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿#￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿( ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ 3 ;￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿6￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ C ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7 ￿￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿* ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ A ￿8 ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿￿￿￿ ￿/ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ G ￿￿￿￿￿( ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ 3 ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿) ￿ . ￿ ￿& ￿ ￿0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ I ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿0￿ J ￿ ￿J ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿7 ￿ ￿￿/ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
.￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿ ( ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿, ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ 3 ￿￿
0￿￿ $ ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿ "￿￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿￿9 ￿   2 % ￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿6￿ ￿ * $ ￿￿ ￿G￿ ￿ ￿ H￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿8 ￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿￿7 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿- ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ 3 ￿ ￿
,￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿, ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ 3 ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿> ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿￿￿, ￿, ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ 3 ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿7 ￿ ￿￿D￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿H ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿> ￿#￿I ￿￿+ ￿7 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ 8 ￿￿
) ￿ . ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/￿ ￿/# ￿ $ % ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿K ￿ ￿ % 7 ￿ /= ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ ￿￿#￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ 8 1 ￿
￿ ￿￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿= ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿/ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿.￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿ ( ￿3 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
/ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿ 8 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿F ￿ 6 ￿￿￿￿J ￿￿0 ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿7 ￿ ￿￿8 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿& ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
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￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
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